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Electromagnetic Eavesdropping
Ireneusz Kubiak
Abstract
Protection of information against electromagnetic penetration is a huge challenge. 
Especially this issue applies to computer station that processes protected information 
and that is a source of electromagnetic disturbances. These disturbances could be 
correlated with processed graphic information. Therefore, very often, they are called 
valuable or unintentional emissions. To protect the information, different methods of 
engineering of electromagnetic compatibility are used, e.g. electromagnetic gaskets, 
signal and power filters and electromagnetic shielding. The use of these methods 
causes a special device to become very heavy, and the looks of such device aren’t nice. 
A new universal solution based on safe fonts is proposed. Safe fonts protect processed 
information against electromagnetic penetration in each case of graphic source of 
valuable emissions. These fonts protect not only Video Graphics Array (VGA) but 
also Digital Video Interface (DVI) standards. These fonts are also useful from electro-
magnetic protection’s point of view in the case of the use of laser printers. All analyses 
are based on images reconstructed from valuable emissions. These emissions are 
measured in a range of frequencies from 100 MHz to 1.5 GHz. Safe fonts are simple 
solution that counteract electromagnetic eavesdropping process. They can replace 
expensive solutions based on shielding, zoning and filtering.
Keywords: electromagnetic eavesdropping, leakage information, protection of 
information, valuable (sensitive) emission, electromagnetic infiltration process, 
image and signal processing, data acquisition, identification, recognition
1. Introduction
Protection of information against electromagnetic eavesdropping in modern 
electronic systems is a big challenge. Such kind of eavesdropping is connected with 
electromagnetic emissions which are correlated with processed information [1–3]. 
This problem increases with a higher and higher use of electronic devices for pro-
cessing and transmitting information. It results from the fact that each electronic 
device is the source of electromagnetic disturbances in particular unintentional 
emission of electromagnetic energy transited in surrounding space. Very often sig-
nals of unintentional emission could be correlated with processed information. The 
electromagnetic emissions with distinctive features can arise at any stage of process-
ing of information (e.g. transmission, displaying on screen, printing) which occur in 
the electric form [1, 4–8]. Video signals are particularly dangerous (Figure 1) [9, 10].
Video graphics array (VGA) and digital video interface (DVI) [11, 12] are video 
standards currently used among other things in nonpublic information systems 
(other elements—keyboard, screen and main unit—of computer station could 
be also sources of sensitive emissions [13, 14]). But the graphic lines (VGA, DVI 
and laser printers) are most susceptible to electromagnetic eavesdropping. These 
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standards are the object of the research on solutions that effectively protect pro-
cessed graphical data. Most frequently, the only solutions used for electromagnetic 
data protection are those design-related which decrease the level of unwanted 
emissions at a source. Many people consider which standard is safer.
Another no less dangerous source of electromagnetic emission, formidable from 
the point of view of the possibility of conducting electromagnetic “watch”, are com-
puter laser printers [15, 16]. They translate the electronic form of processed data into 
graphical form during the printing process. As with every electronic device, printers 
are sources of electromagnetic emanations [17]. Besides control signals, which carry no 
information (e.g. directing the operation of stepper motors or heaters), there are other 
signals (useful signals) that are correlated with the information being processed. Such 
emissions are called “sensitive” or “valuable” or “compromising” emanations from the 
point of view of electromagnetic protection of processed information. Processed data 
may be information displayed on a computer screen or printed (Figure 2).
Organizational and technical solutions are the most often used methods for lim-
iting infiltration sensitivity of devices. Technical solutions are limited to changes in 
Figure 1. 
Examples of reconstructed images for sources of sensitive emissions in the form of (a) VGA standard (receiving 
frequency fo = 681 MHz, measure bandwidth BW = 10 MHz) and (b) DVI standard (receiving frequency 
fo = 852 MHz, measure bandwidth BW = 50 MHz).
3Electromagnetic Eavesdropping
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.86478
the design of devices that typically increase the cost of such devices and sometimes 
limit their functionality. Therefore, it is desirable to find solutions that avoid these 
drawbacks and at the same time allow “safe” processing of classified information. 
An example of an organizational solution might be the establishment of a “control 
zone” around susceptible devices, relying on distance to attenuate signals below 
levels that can be received outside the control zone. Both solutions aren’t acceptable 
by users of these devices.
Note that the costs of acquiring a single computer set, referred to as TEMPEST 
class, are an expense of several of thousand dollars. That is why “software solu-
tions”, based on the use of “safe fonts”, are mentioned more and more often. As 
shown by the results of conducted studies, classified information processed with 
the use of them becomes safe for sources in both the form of video track standard 
VGA and DVI and video track of laser printers. In the case of laser printers, one 
technical method that is commonly used in the field of electromagnetic compatibil-
ity—both to reduce the amount of electromagnetic interference emitted from the 
device and the susceptibility of the device to electromagnetic disturbance—is the 
use of differential-mode signals. This solution protecting printed information was 
described in [18].
Currently there are new searched methods based on software solutions. Such 
solutions could change the character of radiation source. The methods could be 
used to support other solutions or they could be used alone. One of them is safe 
fonts [19, 20]. Very often such fonts are called TEMPEST fonts. There are three 
proposed sets of such fonts: Symmetrical Safe font, Asymmetrical Safe font and 
Simply Safe font (Figure 3). These sets of fonts differ in properties of construction 
of font characters.
Usefulness of these fonts was confirmed from electromagnetic protection’s point 
of view for analogue graphic standard VGA, digital graphic standard DVI and laser 
printers. The collections of these fonts also are resistant to optical character recog-
nition (OCR).
A side-channel attack (SCA) plays a very important role in the electromagnetic 
eavesdropping process. The SCA is built from a source of emission, a receiver of 
emission and space between these two mentioned elements (Figure 4).
This type of SCA has the characteristics of a high-pass filter, which is an impor-
tant property from the protection of information against electromagnetic infiltra-
tion process’ point of view. The SCA is described by formula.
  y′ (t) =  lim 
∆t→0
  x 
(t − ∆ t) − x (t)   ___________
∆ t
 , (1)
where y(t) is the signal (sensitive emission) on the output of SCA and x(t) is the 
signal on the input of SCA. Very often on the output of receiver, a module y”(t) of 
the signal y(t) exists:
Figure 2. 
Sources of sensitive emissions on an example of a personal computer (PC).
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  y′′ (t) =  | lim 
∆t→0
  x 
(t − ∆ t) − x (t)   ___________
∆ t
 | . (2)
In real conditions we cannot forget about noises s(t) and electromagnetic distur-
bances d(t) which could disturb sensitive emissions y”’(t) measured on the output 
of the SCA [21]. Then.
  x ′ (t)  = x (t) + s (t) + d (t) , (3)
  y′′′ (t) =  | lim 
∆t→0
  x′ 
(t − ∆ t) − x′ (t)   _____________
∆ t
 | . (4)
On the output of SCA, only vertical and diagonal edges (rising edges and falling 
edges of pulses of electrical video signals, as on Figure 1a) are visible on recon-
structed images. There are no visible horizontal edges. It is a very important feature 
from electromagnetic penetration process’ point of view.
2. TEMPEST fonts
2.1 Introduction
An important element of daily processing of text information is the use of 
computer fonts. Traditional Arial and Times New Roman fonts are the most 
Figure 3. 
Examples of characters of safe fonts: (a) symmetrical safe font, (b) asymmetrical safe font and (c) simply safe font.
Figure 4. 
A scheme of side-channel attack.
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popular. Characters of these fonts have decorative elements such as an ear, a bowl, 
an eye, a serif, a tail, a terminal, a bracket, a loop, etc. The characters are oval, and 
angles between the individual elements of characters aren’t equal to 90° [22, 23]. In 
addition, the widths of lines building characters are variable. During the processing 
of text data, each character of font has its representation in the form of electrical 
signal. This signal is transmitted from a computer to a screen or to a laser printer. 
In this case, this signal becomes a source of electromagnetic emissions which have 
characteristics of this signal.
Safe fonts are designed according to safety criteria [24, 25]:
• Lines building the characters intersect at a right angle (each character is built 
only from vertical and horizontal lines).
• Font characters are devoid of decorative and diagonal elements.
• General contour of characters of safe font has a rectangle shape.
The safe fonts are fully usable. They are resistant to electromagnetic infiltration 
process as well as OCR process.
The traditional fonts do not meet the mentioned requirements (Figure 5).
2.2 Symmetrical safe font
The font characters are devoid of decorative and diagonal elements. The lines 
building the characters intersect at a right angle. Each character is built from lines 
about two widths (Figure 6). Wider lines are vertical lines of the character; thinner 
lines are horizontal lines of the character. Simultaneously the right proportions of the 
line width and the clearance of each character of the font are maintained. It means 
that the distance between two wider vertical lines is equal to the width of vertical line. 
The corresponding characters have ascender and descender. There aren’t unnecessary 
decorative elements. This makes that the characters of the font are similar with each 
other with high values of correlation coefficient between characters.
2.3 Asymmetrical safe font
Similar to the Symmetrical Safe font, this font could be used in printing process 
and computer techniques. The characters of this font are devoid of decorative and 
diagonal elements. The lines building the characters intersect at a right angle. Each 
character is also built from lines about two widths (Figure 7). However, the location 
of the lines in the characters is different than for the Symmetrical Safe font. Wider 
lines are vertical lines but only as a left part of the character. Thinner lines appear 
as horizontal lines of the character and as a right element of the character. It means 
that the width of wider vertical line is the equal sum of distance between vertical 
lines and width of thinner vertical line. Simultaneously the right proportions of the 
width of the lines and the clearance of each character of font are maintained. The 
corresponding characters have ascender and descender.
Figure 5. 
Distinctive features of times new Roman font on an example of “a” character.
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Figure 8. 
A construction of characters of simply safe font.
2.4 Simply safe font
The Simply Safe font is the third set of safe fonts. The characters of this font 
are devoid of decorative and diagonal elements. The lines building the charac-
ters intersect at a right angle. Each character is built from lines about one width 
(Figure 8). This feature distinguishes this font from two others. Simultaneously 
the right proportions of the width of the lines and the clearance of each char-
acter of font are maintained. The corresponding characters have ascender and 
descender.
3.  Sensitive emissions and possibilities of reconstruction of primary 
information
3.1 Introduction
To assess sensitive emissions from electromagnetic protection of information’s 
point of view, a lot of tests were carried out. The tests were conducted in special 
conditions without additional unwanted sources of electromagnetic disturbances 
[26, 27]. Such conditions exist inside an anechoic chamber (Figure 9). Such type of 
chamber is built from metal sheets. Internal walls of the chamber are covered with 
special hybrid material. These materials (graphite tiles and so-called cones contain-
ing graphite compounds) absorb an energy of electromagnetic waves. There is lack 
of secondary electromagnetic waves.
Sensitive emissions are measured in the range of frequency from about 100 to 
1500 MHz. The upper limit of frequency is pointed by digital video standard. For 
analogue standard the upper limit is equal to about 800 MHz. Of course, it depends 
on the parameters of image displayed on a screen.
Corresponding tests were carried out to show the effectiveness of the tempest 
fonts in the protection of information against electromagnetic penetration process. In 
Figure 6. 
A construction of characters of symmetrical safe font.
Figure 7. 
A construction of characters of asymmetrical safe font.
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analyses we can use a visual method. It applies to images obtained based on sensitive 
emissions measured on corresponding frequencies (Figure 10, selected frequencies).
Parameters of displayed image:
• Resolution (1024 × 768/60 Hz)
• Size of font characters (22 p.)
• Magnification (600%)
Analyzing the images we have to remember the size of characters and the 
magnification. For typical parameters, i.e. 12 p. of the size and 200% of the magni-
fication, the recognition process is much harder and even impossible for safe fonts. 
Very often a coefficient of character error rate (CER)
  CER =  m + k ____q =  
m +  (u − n)  ________q , (5)
where u is the number of characters looked for in an analyzed image, m is the 
number of characters incorrectly recognized, n is the number of characters cor-
rectly recognized, k is the number of unrecognized but looked for characters in 
an analyzed image (k = u – n), and q is the number of all characters existing in an 
analyzed image and is used for precise assessment. The values of this parameter 
were shown on Table 1.
3.2 VGA standard
Signal compatible with the VGA standard has an amplitude ranging from 0 to 
0.7 V, and the maximum number of signal levels, when using all 8-bits to encode 
the brightness of each component of the pixel’s color, is equal to 256. This means 
16, 777, 216 colors are possible to be displayed with the red, green and blue (RGB) 
color palette and correspond to the true color (24-bits) graphic card work mode.
Video signal of the VGA standard has a characteristic structure which enables to 
distinguish unique signatures, which allow its identification, both in the time and 
the frequency domain.
A sensitive emission was measured among other things on the frequency equal 
to 417 MHz (Figure 10a). The emission allowed to reconstructed primary informa-
tion [28–30] which was shown on Figure 11.
Figure 9. 
A view of anechoic chamber with hybrid material.
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3.3 DVI standard
DVI standard specification, developed by the Digital Display Working Group 
(DDWG), gathering many leading hardware manufacturers, was published in 1999 
[11]. In this encoding method, 8-bit RGB data are converted in the graphic card’s 
transmitter into a 10-bit format using transition minimalization and constant com-
ponent balancing (DC-balanced sequence) techniques. However, that does not mean 
that transition-minimized differential signalling (TMDS) encoding and extension DVI 
standard are impervious to electromagnetic eavesdropping. An electric signal in the 
form of a series of zeros and ones is a source of sensitive emissions. Radiated emission 
propagates in the space surrounding the source and is subjected to the effects of a high-
pass filter (SCA). As a result of the original signal (TMDS) distortions of this kind, the 
form of sensitive emission signal becomes usable for electromagnetic eavesdropping.
Time series of signals responsible for transmission of information on pixels’ 
color components in DVI standard show that the DVI interface retains the framing 
principles of signals from the VGA interface. Bit (impulse) series corresponding to 
individual pixels of the image are transmitted in accordance with the TMDS clock in 
Figure 10. 
Levels of electromagnetic emissions measured in frequency domain: (a) VGA standard (b) DVI standard.
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strictly defined time periods. Those periods reflect horizontal and vertical synchro-
nization signals of the analogue VGA signal.
Character Arial 
font
Times new 
roman font
Symmetrical 
safe font
Asymmetrical 
safe font
Simply 
safe font
VGA standard
d 0 0 0 371 1
e 1 6 122 354 48
i 43 17 1 128 115
o 3 9 339 212 174
u 1 2 369 45 107
DVI (HDMI) standard
d 4 4 25 95 72
e 4 4 140 45 65
i 46 14 42 15 153
o 36 7 60 236 351
u 7 3 104 562 6
Table 1. 
Values of character error rate for selected characters of traditional and safe fonts.
Figure 11. 
Fragments of reconstructed images including characters of (a) symmetrical safe font, (b) asymmetrical safe 
font, (c) simply safe font and (d) Arial font.
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A sensitive emission was measured among other things on the frequency of 
926 MHz (Figure 10b). The emission allowed to reconstructed primary information 
which was shown in Figure 12.
4. Conclusions
In this chapter the possibilities of electromagnetic penetration for sources of 
sensitive emissions in the form of analogue (VGA) and digital (DVI, HDMI) video 
standards were described. A solution, which protects processed text information, 
was shown. The solution is based on three sets of tempest font: Symmetrical Safe 
font, Asymmetrical Safe font and Simply Safe font.
Each font is free from distinctive features. Characters of fonts are character-
ized by very high level of similarity. Values of correlation coefficient are more than 
0.7, but the level of legibility is acceptable by potential users. The high level of 
similarity of characters on the input of SCA causes that on the output of SCA the 
recognition of characters is very difficult. For traditional fonts (e.g. Arial or Times 
New Roman), the infiltration process is possible and data acquisition is not difficult 
(Figure 13) [31, 32]. Additionally the tempest fonts counteract the penetration pro-
cess of laser printers. Therefore the new solution is called as a universal solution.
An application of new solution is very easy. Only an installation corresponding 
set font on a computer is necessary [19]. The solution can replace present solutions 
basing on shielding (very heavy elements), filtering, grounding and so on.
The safe fonts obtained protection of the Polish Office Pattern in the form of 
Industrial Design (No. 24487, Figure 14a) and Patent (No. 231691, Figure 14b) [24, 25].
Figure 12. 
Fragments of reconstructed images including characters of (a) symmetrical safe font, (b) asymmetrical safe 
font, (c) simply safe font and (d) Arial font.
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Figure 13. 
Example of reconstructed image for text size 14 p. and magnification 160% written using safe and traditional fonts.
Figure 14. 
A certificate of Industrial Design (a) and a Patent (b) for safe fonts.
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